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Abstract. Due to the externalities, in normal form games a devi-
ation changes the payoﬀ of all players inducing a retaliation by the
remaining or residual players. The stability of an outcome depends
on the expectations potential deviators have about this reaction,
but so far no satisfactory theory has been provided. The present
paper continues the work of Chander and Tulkens (1997) where de-
viators consider residual equilibria, but we allow coalitions to form,
moreover introduce consistency between the residual solution and
the solution of the original game. Optimistic and pessimistic con-
siderations produce a pair of cores. These cores are compared to
some existing cooperative concepts such as the °- and r-cores and
the equilibrium binding agreements. In our ﬁnal section we discuss
the predominance of the grand coalition and suggest a generalisa-
tion of the normal form where such a precedence can be removed.
1. Introduction
Its intuitive, straightforward deﬁnition makes the core one of the
most popular solution concepts in coalition formation games. Further,
Peleg (1992) claims that a solution is “acceptable” only if its axioma-
tisation is similar to that of the core. The original deﬁnition, however,
does not account for externalities, but assumes that a deviating coali-
tion gets the coalitional payoﬀ given by a characteristic function.
In a more general setting, such as the normal form we consider here,
the payoﬀ is also a function of the others’ behaviour. Since such exter-
nalities typically go in both directions, a deviation will inﬂuence (that
is: change) others’ payoﬀs prompting a response that may in turn lead
to secondary reactions. Since in this paper we are not concerned with
the detailed mechanisms of coalition formation, but take a coopera-
tive approach, the deviating players can only realise payoﬀs once the
reaction is known. The residual reaction and the proﬁtability of the
deviation are closely linked. Consequently an accurate modelling of the
reaction of the residual players is essential to understand domination
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and thence the core. The present paper contributes a model where
residuals are treated consistently.
In the following we brieﬂy overview the development of the devi-
ators’ expectations. The characteristic function form was deﬁned by
(von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) from the normal form using
the minimax rule. This deﬁnition equips deviators with excessive pes-
simism: they expect that residuals hurt them as much as possible even
counter their interests. Much of the literature still uses such and simi-
lar models (such as extreme optimism). The recent surge of interest in
games with externalities has led to a reconsideration of this deﬁnition.
While the noncooperative literature, such as Ichiishi (1981) in his
social coalitional equilibrium ignores potential reactions citing simul-
taneity, in cooperative games, where agreements are made collectively
a deviation cannot go unnoticed. Hars´ anyi (1963) introduced a model
where deviators and residuals (cooperatively) bargain with each other
and so the interests of the latter are also represented. Here residu-
als act as one coalition. In the model of Chander and Tulkens (1994)
and Chander and Tulkens (1997) the residuals play individually ra-
tional strategies, that is, a Nash equilibrium is reached against the
deviating players, the residuals acting as singletons. The present pa-
per generalises these approaches by permitting residual players to form
(intermediate) coalition structures and thus pursue group-wise rational
strategies as well.
What is common to most of these models is that they solve the
normal form game essentially via a –however sophisticatedly deﬁned–
characteristic function form game. We do not aim to introduce a new
way to deﬁne a characteristic function, but to apply the core directly
to normal form games.
More recently Ray and Vohra (1997) deﬁned the set of the coarsest
equilibrium binding agreements and Huang and Sj¨ ostr¨ om (2001) the
r-core. The set of equilibrium binding agreements is a farsighted con-
cept, where only credible, reﬁning deviations are permitted. The r-core
is more general than that; its limitation is only that it solves games
via a –though sophisticated– characteristic function that is seldom de-
ﬁned. Non-trivial games exist with non-empty cores where the r-core
is undeﬁned.
The concept we deﬁne allows for arbitrary deviations and includes
some limited farsighted ﬂavour while being a fundamentally myopic
concept; it oﬀers the same rational behaviour to residuals as to devia-
tors.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next part contains
some fundamental deﬁnitions. Section 3 presents some criticisms of
the existing theories as a motivation for the introduction of a new
concept. The fourth section contains the actual deﬁnitions and some
comparisons with other concepts on the market. Section 5 closes withTHE CORE IN NORMAL FORM GAMES 3
the ambitious plan to generalise the normal game form allowing for
games where the grand coalition has a more limited power and where
our cores (after small modiﬁcations) can return some –mathematically–
much more diverse results.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Normal form games. Let N be the set of players. Subsets of N
are called coalitions. A partition P of N is a breaking up of N into dis-
joint coalitions. Π(S) is the set of partitions of any set S of the players.
Let also Xi denote the strategy set for player i and ui :
Q
i2N Xi ! R





in normal form or simply a game.
For any coalition S µ N let XS denote
Q





We will also use X to denote XN. For any x ´ (xi)i2N 2 X and S µ N
we use xS to denote (xj)j2S and if N n S is nonempty x¡S to denote
(xj)j2NnS. Also, for x 2 X and S µ N we denote
P
i2S ui(x) by uS(x).
We will economise our notation by writing the element instead of a
singleton set, such as i instead of fig or R instead of fRg, in particular
¡i stands for N n fig.
The game is a hybrid game in the sense of Zhao (1992) and is played
in two stages. First players form coalitions, then these coalitions, as su-
perplayers play non-cooperatively against each other. We focus on the
ﬁrst, cooperative part and assume that cooperation within coalitions
also includes transfers between players of the coalition. The concept we
introduce can be extended to the more general non-transferable utility
case as well.
For a given partition P the transfers can be described by a trans-
fer scheme (ti)i2N where ti 2 R for all i and we restrict transfers to
coalitions by requiring
P
j2S tj = 0 for all S 2 P. The actual payment
player i receives is its proﬁt ¼i, given by ¼i(x;t;P) = ui(x) + ti. It
will, in general, be diﬀerent from its payoﬀ, although it is clear that for
coalitions we must have uS(x) = ¼S, where ¼S =
P
i2S ¼i. A player’s
aim is to maximise its proﬁt ¼i.
Finally, an outcome is a state of the game summarised by a triple
consisting of a proﬁt and a strategy vector and the partition of the
players, a = (¼;x;P).
2.2. Characteristic function form games. In characteristic func-
tion form games players do not make their own decisions nor receive
individual payoﬀs. Their freedom is limited to joining a coalition (the
singleton coalition consisting of itself included). Then the coalition is4 L´ ASZL´ O ´ A. K´ OCZY
assigned a payoﬀ as given by the characteristic function and indepen-
dently of the formation of other coalitions.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Characteristic function). The characteristic function
assigns a real number to each coalition:
v : 2
N ¡! R (2.1)
S 7¡! v(S): (2.2)
A game in the characteristic function form is a pair (N;v).
In the following we give the deﬁnition of the core and the coalition
structure core.
Imputations are proﬁt vectors that satisfy ¼i ¸ v(i) (individual ra-
tionality) and x = v(N) (eﬃciency).
An imputation ¼ is dominated via coalition S if v(S) > ¼S. Mem-
bers of the dominating coalition S beneﬁt from forming S and leaving
the grand coalition, which is often regarded as the socially desirable
outcome (especially if superadditivity is assumed). Imputation ¼ is
dominated if it is dominated via some coalition S µ N. The core
collects undominated imputations.
In characteristic function games an outcome is a pair (¼;P) that
satisﬁes ¼i ¸ v(i) (individual rationality) and ¼S = v(S) for all S 2 P
combining feasibility and eﬃciency. Outcomes generalise imputations
as the formation of the grand coalition is not presumed.
An outcome (¼;P) is dominated via coalition S if v(S) > ¼S. Ob-
serve that S = 2 P. The outcome (¼;P) is dominated if it is dominated
via some coalition S µ N. The coalition structure core collects the
undominated outcomes (Greenberg 1994).
3. Solving the game
The game consists of two stages and the solution of the two stages
is presented independently. We require the solutions to be subgame
perfect: we may solve the second stage independently of the ﬁrst, but in
solving the ﬁrst we must look into the consequences in the second stage.
That is, ﬁrst we must establish the solution of the non-cooperative stage
and only then are we able to solve the cooperative stage.
3.1. Noncooperative stage. Let us assume that a coalition struc-
ture P has already formed. To solve this stage we use the best-response
property Ray and Vohra (1997) have introduced, essentially a general-
isation of the Nash-equilibrium for coalitions that act as players. Al-
though Ray and Vohra (1997) provide a direct deﬁnition, here it is
more suitable to us to present it by ﬁrst considering individual best
responses. Thus our deﬁnition follows the logic of the best-response
equilibrium for extensive form games (Kuhn 1953).THE CORE IN NORMAL FORM GAMES 5
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Best response of a coalition). The strategy x¤
S 2 XS






where x¡S 2 X¡S.
We assume that the payoﬀ function satisﬁes a non-levelness property,
that is, the best responses are unique. While this assumption is by no
means essential to our results, it simpliﬁes the arguments and removing
it poses no diﬃculty.
The above deﬁnition is generalised directly to more then one coali-
tion.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Best response of a set of coalitions). The strategy
x¤
S 2 XS is a best response for the partition S 2 Π(S) for S µ N if it
is a best response for all coalition C 2 S.1
The case when S = N deserves special attention.
Deﬁnition 3.3 (Best response property). The strategy vector x 2 X
satisﬁes the best response property relative to P if it is a best response
to itself for all coalitions S in P.
This deﬁnition is equivalent to the following: The strategy vector
x 2 X satisﬁes the best response property relative to P if for each
coalition S 2 P and x0
S 2 XS we have uS(x0
S;x¡S) · uS(x). Let ¯(P)
denote the set of best response strategy proﬁles.
The existence of such equilibria is well known under certain condi-
tions that mostly hold.
3.2. Cooperative stage. Knowing what coalition formation yields we
solve the ﬁrst, cooperative stage. Since we look for a core-like concept
collecting undominated outcomes we must know what a coalition can
expect by deviating. Normal form games are more complex than char-
acteristic form games in two ways: We may have multiple best-response
strategy proﬁles in the second stage even for a given partition, and sec-
ondly a deviation is followed by a retaliation by the residuals due to
the widespread externalities present. This retaliation may then prompt
secondary and even further reactions.
Unlike Ray and Vohra (1997) we consider myopic players. How can
deviators predict the end outcome, in particular, their terminal pay-
oﬀ? The mathematically appealing simplest approach is conservatism:
indeed the characteristic function of a coalition has originally been







1In particular the responses must be the best to each other.6 L´ ASZL´ O ´ A. K´ OCZY
Thus deviating players are assuming the worst: A coalition deviates
only if in all cases, with all possible reactions it will be better oﬀ.
However “all cases” may very unrealistic ones, too. Using the words of
Ray and Vohra, why should we expect that residual players act in such
a bloodthirsty fashion as to hurt deviators to the maximum extent?
Excessive pessimism, or, for that matter, excessive optimism can be
very misleading and are subject to signiﬁcant improvements.
3.3. The °¡core. Chander and Tulkens (1997) took a major step
in reﬁning these approaches. Their key idea is that non-equilibrium
residual strategy-proﬁles are subject to further deviations, and hence
will necessarily be abandoned. Therefore should the chain of reactions
stop it cannot stop at such instable outcomes. Therefore the deviating
players should only consider residual equilibria as possible reactions.
Chander and Tulkens (1994) picked Nash equilibria, or in their termi-
nology, individually rational behaviour.
Deﬁnition 3.4 (Dominance with individually rational residual reac-
tion). An outcome a = (¼;x;P) is dominated via coalition S if in
the partition PS consisting of S and singletons there exists a strategy
vector x0 2 X that satisﬁes
uS(x






¡S) for all x
00






¡i) for all i in N n S and x
00
i 2 Xi. (3.3)
If a is dominated via coalition S, then there exists a proﬁt vector
¼0 2 RN such that ¼0
S = uS(x0) and ¼0
i ¸ ¼i for all i 2 S moreover there
exists a player i 2 S such that ¼0
i > ¼i. Then we can say that outcome
b = (¼0;x0;PS) dominates a via S.
This deﬁnition then enables us to deﬁne a characteristic function
and the core of the corresponding characteristic function form game,
broadly known as the °¡core (Chander and Tulkens 1997).
Note the hidden optimism in this deﬁnition: the coalition is willing to
abandon a if there exists a better outcome b even though the formation
of b is not guaranteed: a diﬀerent, less advantageous Nash equilibrium
may equally likely occur.
While in this model deviators are more realistic about the residual
reaction, they presume that no other coalitions form. In the following
concept we relax this assumption.
4. The core of a normal form game
4.1. Need for a more general solution. A new concept should sat-
isfy the following:
² Solution in the original game form.
² Domination/deviation is for once and all without renegotiation.THE CORE IN NORMAL FORM GAMES 7
² Following Chander and Tulkens (1994) only look at residual
equilibrium outcomes.
² Consistency of global and residual equilibrium concepts includ-
ing equal treatment of deviating and residual players.
² Pareto-eﬃcient.
The last two points need elaboration.
4.1.1. Pareto eﬃciency. We insist on the Pareto-eﬃciency of core out-
comes. For that we need to allow multi coalition deviations.
Most existing concepts exclude the possibility that more then one
coalition deviates at the same time. In games without externalities
multi-coalition deviations reproduce as a sequence of single-coalition
deviations and as long as “undominance” is concerned, a deviation by
a set of coalitions or by only one of them makes no diﬀerence.
As we introduce externalities this feature changes. The appendix
shows a 4-player game where for the partitions P0 = f1;2;3;4g, P1 =
ff1;2g;3;4g, P2 = f1;2;f3;4gg and P3 = ff1;2g;f3;4gg have both
unique Nash equilibria giving respectively 2, 4, 4 and 6 to each coali-
tion. While P3 Pareto-dominates P3 it cannot be attained via a se-
quence of proﬁtable deviations as the formation of f1;2g or f3;4g is
not proﬁtable, moreover at the same time the remaining players (still
singletons) enjoy 4 each, so for them forming the other pair is dis-
advantageous. In this paper we require Pareto domination to imply
domination, and for this reason we permit multi-coalition deviations.
4.1.2. Residual behaviour. The number of diﬀerent approaches to model
the residual behaviour indicates how diﬃcult this task actually is. In
order to make progress one often had to make compromises and sim-
plify the model by additional –often arbitrary– assumptions. While
these assumptions may hold in speciﬁc situations, they limit the over-
all applicability of the model. In designing the following model the idea
is exactly not to introduce new ideas, not to make new assumptions,
but to build from the bricks we already have: deviations induce resid-
ual subgames of a more limited strategy space and these are solved
using the same concept as the large game. This results in a recursive
deﬁnition.
We begin by deﬁning this residual game, a function of the deviating
partition.













where R is the residual set, S 2 ΠN n R is the partition of the deviating
players, and uS
i is the residual payoﬀ function that we deﬁne as follows
for all x 2 XR.
(4.2) u
S
i (x) = ui(x;x
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where x¤ 2 XNnR is a best response strategy proﬁle for all coalitions in
S.
The residual game is a normal form game like the initial game, with a
trivial, but crucial diﬀerence that jRj < jNj. This enables us to deﬁne
the core in a recursive way.
Our deﬁnition makes use of a simpliﬁcation: the deviating coalitions
play the best response to the residuals’ strategies. This appears to
give them an advantage over the residual players. However, a point we
make is that the residual game is played as a fully independent game,
that is, with both the ﬁrst and the second stage played. When deﬁning
best response equilibria in the second stage, we will however already
consider the externalities of S playing the best response all the time, so
that any best response in the residual game is also a best response to
that. This removes for the aforementioned advantage. Consequently
residual best response equilibria embed into best response equilibria in
the original game, when complemented with the best responses of the
deviating players.
4.1.3. Behavioural assumptions. Deviating players consider a set of
residual equilibria that have diﬀerent implications on their payoﬀs.
Without introducing further considerations, such as eﬃciency or a pref-
erence for a certain coalition structure we cannot make a selection of
these equilibria. We use optimism and pessimism on the side of the de-
viating players to consider the extreme cases, but here the core shows
a reduced sensitivity to behavioural assumptions.
4.2. Deﬁnitions. The deﬁnitions are inductive and are done in four
steps each. For a trivial single-player game we can give the core ex-
plicitly. Given the deﬁnition for all at most k ¡1 player games we can
give our deﬁnition of dominance for k player games. Once dominance
is deﬁned, we may deﬁne the core. First we give the deﬁnition for the
pessimistic case, and then a slightly modiﬁed version comes for the
optimistic core.
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Core - pessimistic case). The deﬁnition consists of
four steps:





be a game. The core of a game Γ1 with N = f1g
is given by the payoﬀ-dominant strategy of this single player:




¯ P = f1g; x 2 ¯(P); ¼ = ¼1 = u1(x)
ª
Step 2. Inductive assumption.
We assume that the core has been deﬁned for all games with at most
k ¡ 1 players. Now we give the deﬁnition for a game with k players.
Step 3. Dominance
Consider the outcome (¼;x;P) and a deviation S 2 Π(S) by S µTHE CORE IN NORMAL FORM GAMES 9
N and the corresponding residual game ΓS over the residual set R.
Let r¤ 2 XS denote the best response of the deviating coalitions to a
residual strategy vector r 2 XR
The outcome (¼;x;P) is dominated via S 2 Π(S) if in the corre-
sponding residual game Γs over the residual set R either:
(1) the residual core C¡ (Γs) is empty and for all strategy proﬁles
r 2 XR \ ¯(R) for some R 2 Π(R) we have uT(r¤;r) > ¼T for
all T 2 S, or
(2) the residual core C¡ (Γs) is not empty and for all (¼0;r;Q) 2
C¡ (Γs) we have that r satisﬁes uT(r¤;r) > ¼T for all T 2 S.
An outcome (¼;x;P) is dominated if it is dominated via a set of coali-
tions.
Step 4. Core
The core of a game of k players is the set of undominated outcomes





Deﬁnition 4.3 (Core - optimistic case). The deﬁnition consists of four
steps:





be a game. The core of a game Γ1 with N = f1g
is given by the payoﬀ-dominant strategy of this single player:




¯ P = f1g; x 2 ¯(P); ¼ = ¼1 = u1(x)
ª
Step 2. Inductive assumption.
We assume that the core has been deﬁned for all games with at most
k ¡ 1 players. Now we give the deﬁnition for a game with k players.
Step 3. Dominance
Consider the outcome (¼;x;P) and a deviation S 2 Π(S) by S µ
N and the corresponding residual game ΓS over the residual set R.
Let r¤ 2 XS denote the best response of the deviating coalitions to a
residual strategy vector r 2 XR
The outcome (¼;x;P) is dominated via S 2 Π(S) if in the corre-
sponding residual game Γs over the residual set R either:
(1) the residual core C¡ (Γs) is empty and for all strategy proﬁles
r 2 XR \ ¯(R) for some R 2 Π(R) we have uT(r¤;r) > ¼T for
all T 2 S, or
(2) the residual core C¡ (Γs) is not empty and for all (¼0;r;Q) 2
C¡ (Γs) we have that r satisﬁes uT(r¤;r) > ¼T for all T 2 S.
(1) the residual core C¡ (Γs) is empty and there exists a strategy
proﬁle r 2 XR\¯(R) for some R 2 Π(R) such that uT(r¤;r) >
¼T for all T 2 S, or
(2) the residual core C¡ (Γs) is not empty and there exists an out-
come (¼0;r;Q) 2 C¡ (Γs) such that r satisﬁes uT(r¤;r) > ¼T for
all T 2 S.10 L´ ASZL´ O ´ A. K´ OCZY
An outcome (¼;x;P) is dominated if it is dominated via a set of coali-
tions.
Step 4. Core
The core of a game of k players is the set of undominated outcomes





4.3. Interpretation. The induction relies on two simple facts: the
obvious deﬁnition for a trivial one-person game, and on the aforemen-
tioned reduction of residual games. To test whether a given outcome is
in the core we must test it against deviations by all possible combina-
tions of disjoint coalitions and for all of their strategies. A deviation is
successful if it represents an improvement and deviating players deviate
expecting rational residual behaviour.
Two cases are considered: a non-empty residual core implies a non-
transient residual outcome. Moreover for normal form games the non-
emptiness of the core implies that the grand coalition can form where all
claims are satisﬁed, that is, in contrast to characteristic function form
games the core outcomes represent social optima. Should the core be
empty such outcomes do not exist, and based on our theories there
is no way to predict which outcomes arise. Therefore we only require
that the strategy proﬁle chosen satisﬁes the best-response property for
the coalition structure that formed, but make no restriction on the
coalition structure. This is a direct generalisation of the concept of
Chander and Tulkens (1994).
Observe the diﬀerent attitude in the optimistic and the pessimistic
approaches. In the optimistic case a deviation occurs if there is a
way to achieve improvement for all deviating coalitions, while in the
pessimistic case such an improvement must be guaranteed in all cases.
4.4. Features and properties.




be a game and let C(Γ) be one
of its cores (optimistic or pessimistic). Then if (¼;x;P) 2 C(Γ) such
that P 6= fNg, then (¼;x;fNg) 2 C(Γ).
Proof. First we show that x 2 ¯(fNg). Should this not hold then
the grand coalition would upset the outcome, and play something else.
Since the grand coalition has a complete control over the strategy se-
lection it deviates if there exists a strategy proﬁle x0 2 X such that
uN(x0) > uN(x). However, should such an x0 exist the outcome (¼;x;P)
would be dominated via the grand coalition contradicting (¼;x;P) 2 C.
Now given that x 2 ¯(fNg), the outcome (¼;x;fNg) 2 C is only
subject to coalitional deviations. Since (¼;x;P) has the same payoﬀ
for all players and by our assumption is immune to all deviations, we
get the required result. ¤
Now consider an outcome and a coalitional deviation. The residual
core –provided non-empty– consists of outcomes with strategies thatTHE CORE IN NORMAL FORM GAMES 11
are optimal under the grand coalition. From the point of view of ex-
ternalities, transfers between players do not matter, so we focus on the
set of core-strategy proﬁles. While theoretically it is possible that they
all produce the same total payoﬀ for the grand coalition, in applica-
tions we will often ﬁnd either a unique core-strategy vector or strategy
vectors with symmetries across players that give the same to the de-
viating players. Then the expectations and hence the cores under the
optimistic and the pessimistic scenarios coincide. Note, however that
this property holds only for ‘games with nonempty residual cores and
only for “most” of these.2
4.5. Comparison to existing concepts.
4.5.1. Classical approaches. Since the seminal work of von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944) one typically constructs the characteristic func-
tion by taking the worst case. Cornet (1998) considers variations of this
approach as well as its optimistic pair. While the simplicity of these
deﬁnitions is appealing it is clear that if we insist on externalities or if
externalities play a signiﬁcant role such considerations are misleading.
It requires no proof to see that when we apply a smaller residual
strategy set the behavioural assumptions (optimism/pessimism) play a
smaller role and as a result our concept, although contains an element
of optimism or pessimism, is less sensitive to them. An illustration for
this can be found at (K´ oczy 2002) for a game in the partition function
form, a generalisation of the characteristic function form that includes
externalities.
Another point we insist on is to take the two cores together, as
the upper and lower ends of an interval of sets (for inclusion). This
interval is always conﬁned in the interval of classical optimistic and
pessimistic cores and is typically narrower. The two cores enable us
to make diﬀerent types of predictions, or to avoid diﬀerent types of
errors. The optimistic core is smaller; if an outcome belongs to this
core it is surely in the core. If an outcome is outside the –typically
larger– pessimistic core then it is deﬁnitely dominated. For the rest
these theories do not give a decisive conclusion.
4.5.2. The °-core. In Section 3.3 we have already discussed the °-core
of Chander and Tulkens (1997) in detail. The core-pair we have intro-
duced generalises the notion of °-core. On the other hand there is no
exclusion-inclusion relation between the °-core and the above core-pair.
2Our remark follows the same philosophy as with the emptiness of the core:
Although we know that the core can be empty, we keep on using it, and hope that
in the given application it will not be. Here we can also hope to have coinciding
optimistic and pessimistic cores giving very robust results.12 L´ ASZL´ O ´ A. K´ OCZY
4.5.3. Equilibrium binding agreements. 3 Ray and Vohra (1997) de-
ﬁned equilibrium binding agreements (EBA’s ) and the concept became
instantaneously popular for games with externalities. The EBA’s are
outcomes with best-response strategy proﬁles that are also immune to
“credible” defections by a subcoalition. While the original deﬁnition
did not allow transfers here we consider a TU-version to allow a better
comparison.
We need some extra notation. For a partition P, let R(P) denote
its reﬁnements. The coalitions of a reﬁnement ˆ P of P are subsets of
coalitions in P. The deviating coalitions in ˆ P that enforced ˆ P from P
are called perpetrators while the rest are the residuals. As a coalition
may break into several, say k subcoalitions, k ¡ 1 of these have to be
labelled as perpetrators. A re-merging is a coalition structure formed
by the merger of perpetrators with their respective residuals.
Deﬁnition 4.5 (Equilibrium binding agreements for a given partition).
The deﬁnition is recursive. Let B(P) denote the set of EBA’s for a given
partition P.
1. For the trivial partition, P0 of singleton coalitions as no further
deviations are allowed, B(P0) = ¯(P0).
2. Now consider partitions P with P0 as the only possible reﬁnement.
For any x 2 ¯(P) we say that (u(x0);x0;P0) blocks (¼;x;P) if x0 2
B(P), and there exists a perpetrator S such that uS(x0) > ¼S(x).
3. Assume that for some P the set B(P0) has been deﬁned for all
P0 2 R(P) and that for each x0 2 ¯(P0) all outcomes (¼00;x00;P00)
blocking outcome (¼0;x0;P0) have been found.
4. Let x 2 ¯(P). Then (¼;x;P) is blocked by (¼0;x0;P0) if P0 2
R(P) and there exists a collection of perpetrators and residuals in the
move from P to P0 such that
(1) x0 is a binding agreement for P0,
(2) x0 satisﬁes that x0
S = uS(x0) for all S in P,
(3) there is a leading perpetrator S, which gains from the move,
that is, x0
S(x0) > uS(x),
(4) any re-merging, ˆ P of the other perpetrators is blocked by out-
come (¼0;x0;P0) as well, with one of these perpetrators as a
leading perpetrator. Formally, let S be the set of perpetrators
other than S in the move from P to P0. Then B( ˆ P) = ; and
there exists a strategy proﬁle ˆ x 2 ¯( ˆ P), a proﬁt vector ˆ ¼ and
3Due to the formal similarities our core concept is often compared to the Equi-
librium Binding Agreements of Ray and Vohra (1997). We have therefore felt it
important to compare the two concepts in some detail, although we have some reser-
vations about the implications of such a comparison. These concerns were articu-
lated by Murat Sertel at the 8th Coalition Theory Workshop in Aix-en-Provance,
saying that farsighted concepts deal with fundamentally diﬀerent games and as
such cannot be used to improve or correct myopic concepts. Thus a comparison of
Equilibrium Binding Agreements and the core is also not really appropriate.THE CORE IN NORMAL FORM GAMES 13
S0 2 S, such that (ˆ ¼; ˆ x; ˆ P) is blocked by (¼0;x0;P0) with S0 as
the leading perpetrator.
5. A strategy proﬁle a is an equilibrium binding agreement for P if
x 2 ¯ (P) and there is no (¼0;x0;P0) that blocks (¼;x;P).
Several diﬀerent partitions may admit EBA’s. Since the grand coali-
tion is taken as the starting point the focus is on the the EBA’s with
the grand coalition itself, or if such agreements do not exists the EBA’s
admitted by the coarsest partitions.
In the following we list some similarities and diﬀerences between
the cores and the EBA’s and produce some simple results about their
relation.
One notices immediately the otherwise uncommon recursive deﬁni-
tion. The leading perpetrators “leave the room” and the negotiations
continue with the residuals only, just as in the theory we proposed.
However, equilibrium binding agreements are only safe against reﬁning
deviations: Ray and Vohra further assumes that “leaving the room”
breaks all contacts and further communication is impossible. We al-
low arbitrary deviations, as we think that the purpose of a deviation
is exactly to establish a new alliance where the individuals interests
are better respected. This aforementioned limitation is the reason for
the arbitrary starting point: the grand coalition, while in our case the
bargaining can start anywhere.
EBA’s are only safe against credible deviations that are not sub-
ject to subsequent deviations. Clearly our concept cannot satisfy such
a property. Most outcomes are subject to a deviation via the grand
coalition. In particular, when we test the stability of the grand coali-
tion we ﬁnd that (almost) no deviations are credible as renegotiation
is always possible. On the other hand, while we call our concept my-
opic the stability of the resulting outcome is safe against most possible
subsequent deviations, and so stability is concerned our concept con-
tains also some farsighted ﬂavour. Before we discuss this further, note
that we do not explicitly determine the post-deviation outcome, but
consider a set of outcomes that can form. Recall also that the de-
viation occurred not to attain certain outcomes, but based on beliefs
about what the resulting outcome can be. Therefore the credibility
of a deviation does not depend on what the deviating players get in
a given post-deviation outcome, but what could it get considering all
cases. A post-deviation outcome must be stable against three types of
deviations to have credibility.
(1) The deviating coalitions contain both deviating and residual
players. If we measure farsightedness against EBA’s where such
regrouping is not permitted we can exclude this case.
(2) The deviating players are all original deviators: This subsequent
deviation is also proﬁtable from the starting outcome so this14 L´ ASZL´ O ´ A. K´ OCZY
way we replace a non-credible deviation by another proﬁtable
deviation. Moreover, if we assume that a deviating set of players
always chooses the best deviating partition the new deviation
must contain only a subset of players eventually leading to a
deviation that is immune to subsequent ones.
(3) The deviating players are all residuals. Here we discuss two
subcases.
(a) The residual core was empty. Deviating players already
expected this instability of the residual game hence the
deviation results in no change.
(b) The residual core was not empty. A subsequent deviation
can only be proﬁtable if the leading deviators change their
strategies as well. But since the post-deviation outcome
is now taken as the starting point there seems to be no
problem with changing roles, and indeed this type would
break the credibility of some deviations.
Farsightedness makes stability easier, restricting deviations to reﬁn-
ing ones makes it harder to maintain, and so the relation between the
cores and the equilibrium binding agreements is somewhat unclear.
In the following we give a simple lemma about the relation of the
core and the EBA’s. Since EBA’s are deﬁned in an optimistic form, we
also use the optimistic core for a better comparison.
Lemma 4.6. If all equilibrium binding agreements are ineﬃcient the
(optimistic) core of the game is empty.
Proof. Ineﬃciencies arise if all outcomes (¼;x;P) with P = fNg are
blocked, where x 2 ¯(fNg). we show that blocking correspond to
deviations. Our proof is by induction.
1. The result is trivial for single-player games.
2. Assume that the lemma holds for all games with at most n ¡ 1
players.
3. Prove the lemma for a game with n-players.
If an outcome is blocked, then there exists a perpetrator that gets
better oﬀ given the EBA’s in the residual game.
(1) If the residual core of the corresponding deviation is empty,
under the optimistic beliefs the deviating coalition expects at
least this much, thus it will also deviate.
(2) If the residual core is not empty, by Lemma 4.4 it contains
outcomes with strategies supporting the grand coalition, then
–using our inductive assumption– the grand coalition is the
coarsest residual EBA, hence the perpetrators of the ongoing
blocking have the same beliefs as the deviating coalition(s), and
so deviation and blocking happens at the same time.
We have checked all possibilities, and found that deviations and block-
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best response strategies under the grand coalition. By our proof then
there are proﬁtable deviations from all core outcomes supporting the
grand coalition. But by the same Lemma 4.4 this implies that the core
is empty. This proves our lemma. ¤
This result, however, does not imply that the set of the coarsest
EBA’s would include the core. If the core is not empty, by Lemma 4.6
there exist eﬃcient EBA’s that is, there exists an EBA for the grand
coalition, too. Thus if the core contains outcomes with diﬀerent parti-
tions they will not be in the solution of Ray and Vohra.
4.5.4. The r-core. Huang and Sj¨ ostr¨ om (2001) deﬁne the r-theory and
among others the r-core. In this parallel work to ours they consider
a similar game and depart from a rather similar idea, but on the end
their implementation is somewhat diﬀerent and these diﬀerences be-
come magniﬁed as we look at the ﬁnal product. Their aim is also to
introduce consistency in dealing with the residual players, but they
keep the characteristic function as an intermediate tool to ﬁnd a solu-
tion. For completeness we present their deﬁnition. In order to do this
we need to introduce some extra notation.
For any set S µ N let S be a partition of S and let R be its com-
plement.Then let X (S) denote the set of possible strategies given S.
The worth of each subcoalition T µ R is denoted by V S(T).4
Deﬁnition 4.7 (r-core (Huang and Sj¨ ostr¨ om 2001)). The deﬁnition
consists of ﬁve steps.
Step 1. Trivial case
If jRj = 1 then for any S partition of N n R,
X (S) ´ ¯(S [ fRg):
Step 2. Induction hypothesis
Assume that X (S) has been deﬁned for all 1 · jRj · k ¡ 1 and all
partitions S of N n R.
Step 3. Inductive step
Consider R, such that jRj = k. Then let
V




¯ x 2 ¯ (S [ fRg)
ª
;
and for any proper subset T ( R deﬁne
V




¯ x 2 X (S [ fR n Tg)
ª
The right hand side of the expression is well-deﬁned since R n T has
strictly fewer players and is nonempty.
4Our notation simpliﬁes that of Huang and Sj¨ ostr¨ om (2001). In their work V S(T)
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Step 4. The deﬁnition of X (S)
Let C(R;V S) denote the core of the (characteristic function form) game
(R;V S). Then








Step 5. The largest game
As the induction continues we reach larger and larger residual games.
Huang and Sj¨ ostr¨ om (2001) consider the extreme case a deviation by a
grand coalition at the end as if it happened in a residual game that co-
incides with the entire game. The above deﬁnitions can be reproduced
here without a problem bearing in mind that S = ;. This concludes
the deﬁnition.
While reducing the game to the characteristic function form saves
us from part of the complicity we encountered in our deﬁnitions, it
becomes a limiting feature in two aspects. Firstly the characteristic
function cannot directly give payoﬀs for multi-coalition deviations; so
Huang and Sj¨ ostr¨ om allows deviators to optimise their partition (Equa-
tion 4.5), but this deﬁnition seems to allow transfers across deviating
coalitions. This feature may lead to deviations that are proﬁtable for
all deviators in the characteristic function form game but the same
deviation in the normal form could even result in a loss for players in
some of the coalitions involved. For this reason we think it is unap-
propriate to use the characteristic function as an intermediate tool to
solve normal form games.
Secondly, Huang and Sj¨ ostr¨ om insist on consistency to the extent
that their characteristic function is only deﬁned if all residual cores are
nonempty. As the size of games increase, the number of residual games
increase tremendously and this requirement becomes very demanding.
Huang and Sj¨ ostr¨ om realise this problem and suggest it as a topic for
further research. The present paper oﬀers a possible answer.
This restriction raises a more fundamental issue that we illustrate
with a 4-player game having an empty residual core (Table 1).
L C R
l c r l c r l c r
u 5555 6005 0555 0065 0105 1845 5505 4815 0005
U m 0605 0015 1485 1005 0005 0005 8415 0005 0005
d 5055 4185 0005 8145 0005 0005 0005 0005 1115
u 8880 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
D m 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
d 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
Table 1. A 4-player example with an empty residual coreTHE CORE IN NORMAL FORM GAMES 17
Players 1, 2, 3 and 4 have strategies fl, c, rg, fu, m, dg, fL, C, Rg
and fU, Dg respectively. Payoﬀs are represented as 4-digit numbers to
save space, where the respective digits give the payoﬀ of the individual
players, so for instance at (c, d, L, U) we read 4185, therefore player 1
gets 4, player 2 gets 1, player 3 gets 8 and player 4 gets 5. The game is
symmetric in the ﬁrst three players. After an inspection of the payoﬀs
we ﬁnd that the grand coalition maximizes its payoﬀ by playing (l, u, L,
D), where it collects 24. Consider a deviation by player 4. The residual
core is empty. This makes the r-characteristic function and hence the
r-core undeﬁned, even though the payoﬀ of player 4 is independent of
the residual strategies: 5. Our concepts ﬁnd coincidental nonempty op-
timistic and pessimistic cores. An intuitive argument yields the same:
All residual reactions satisfying the best-response property yield the
same payoﬀ for the deviating coalition. Moreover the payoﬀ of a devi-
ating coalition is the same regardless of the coalitions it coordinated its
deviation. Hence in this case the characteristic function is well deﬁned
and yields the same nonempty core. Put it diﬀerently: the above game
is a normal-form representation of a characteristic function game with
a nonempty core. Yet, the r-core is undeﬁned and hence it is not a
generalisation of the core.
5. Cohesiveness and the grand coalition
5.1. Criticisms of cohesiveness. We have deﬁned the new core con-
cept for games in the classical and very intuitive normal or strategic
form. A strategic form game is deﬁned by a set of players, their pos-
sible strategies and a payoﬀ function that describes the proceeds from
a given strategy proﬁle, or in other words, what a single play of the
game yields. The deﬁnition is indeed very intuitive and ﬂexible, we can
easily model everyday situations by normal form games.
Problems begin when we allow coalitions to form. What is actually
the role of a coalition? Players form coalitions to coordinate their
strategy selection and to allow transfers, or compensations should the
overall optimal strategy be suboptimal for individual members. Is it
realistic to assume that a coalition’s strategies are the combinations of
its members’ strategies? Can it follow all of these strategies, exactly
these, and only these? In particular: is it realistic to assume that
the grand coalition can do anything its members could, and, moreover,
achieve the any payoﬀ its members would? Cohesiveness as this feature
is called seems to be rather limiting. Indeed, much of the criticism of
superadditivity applies also to this weaker form.
The grand coalition is often the starting point and the purpose of
the game is often to ﬁnd a “fair” or “stable” distribution of the pay-
oﬀ of the grand coalition. For some games this idea might work well:
“superadditivity is intuitively rather compelling; why should not dis-
joint coalitions when acting together get at least as much as they can18 L´ ASZL´ O ´ A. K´ OCZY
when acting separately?” (Aumann and Dr` eze 1975, p233). However
there might be situations when there are objective reasons that disallow
the formation of the grand coalitions, such as legal objections against
monopolies. Aumann and Dr` eze (1975), Guesnerie and Oddou (1979)
and more recently Carraro and Siniscalco (1988) discuss circumstances
where subadditivity occurs and/or the grand coalition does not form.
The fact that here we always get the grand coalition (Lemma 4.4) sug-
gest that there is either a problem with the solution applied or the
speciﬁcation of the game.
Also: Zhou (1994) lists 3 conditions that a solution should satisfy.
The core already fails, because it can be empty, but this feature has
long been accepted as a price for simplicity. Now here, although we
started from the coalition structure core, we always produce outcomes
with the grand coalition that makes the core fail for the second time.
This again suggests that we should look for a change. We believe the
improvement should be made at the side of the game and not of the
solution.
The purpose of this section is to suggest a generalisation of the nor-
mal form that allows other coalition structures to emerge as optimal.
5.2. Generalisation of the normal form. Our generalisation is anal-
ogous to the step from games in the characteristic function form to
games in partition function form although our motivation is diﬀerent:
The partition function form was deﬁned by Thrall and Lucas (1963)
to introduce externalities in coalition formation games. Externalities
are already present here, we want to introduce subadditivity that is
a matter of course in characteristic function games. In our deﬁnition
we will essentially deﬁne a partition function that in turn deﬁnes a
payoﬀ function corresponding to a diﬀerent normal form game for each
partition as follows.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Generalised normal form game). Let N be the set of
players, P a partition of the players and S µ N a coalition. Then we
deﬁne a strategic partition function:
(5.1)
U : Π(N) ¡! Φ
P 7¡!
¡Q
S2P ˜ XS (P) 7¡! RjPj¢
˜ x(P) 7¡! uP(˜ x(P));
where Φ is the set of possible payoﬀ functions.
In this game coalitions have their “own” strategies, such as ˜ xS and we
tried to reﬂect it in the notation as well: here the coalitions’ strategies
are no more products of their members strategies (xS), but act as
players on their own (˜ xS). At the same time it is very easy to produce
the generalised normal form of a normal form game starting from the
payoﬀ function for the all-singletons partition P0 and setting ˜ XS (P) =
XS(P0) =
Q
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Diﬃcult as it seems the generalised normal form is not at all more
complicated than the normal form while it oﬀers the desired generality.
It is also clear that the core concepts extend to this form after small
changes in the notation and that once the grand coalition becomes less
attractive (mathematically) more colourful cores may arise.
6. Conclusion
The model we presented here is rather general: although we have
made certain assumptions to facilitate our arguments many of these
can be removed without signiﬁcantly aﬀecting our results. In contrast
to other concepts we have made every eﬀort to minimise the advantage
the deviating players over the residuals. We have obtained this both by
permitting much more general and consequently more realistic resid-
ual reaction, and by restricting the deviating players’ possibilities to
impose an arbitrary situation on the residuals. While this formulation
is more appropriate in many, symmetric situations, in others, such as
a Stackelberg leader-follower model, or in a Bertrand competition we
may actually want to give certain advantage to the deviating players.
In such a case the residual game is a function of the deviators’ strate-
gies, while it does not depend on their partition, which only inﬂuences
the transfers they can make among themselves.









where R is the residual set, s 2 XNnR is the strategy of the deviat-
ing coalitions, and us
i is the residual payoﬀ function that we deﬁne as




When we use this deﬁnition the two stages cannot be separated so
clearly, as a deviation in the cooperative stage already announces a
strategy for the non-cooperative stage. In addition to that the residual
players will play knowing this strategy and hence the noncooperative
play can be sequential, not necessarily simultaneous. Of course all this
refers to deviations, while for core outcomes deviations do not arise
and all these arguments are purely theoretical.
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Appendix A. Pareto efficiency requires multi-coalition
deviations
Table 2 deﬁnes a 4-player game with the property that the par-
tition P = ff12g;f34gg Pareto-dominates P0 ff1g;f2g;f3g;f4gg,
while only dominates it via the entire partition P and not via either
of the coalitions. This observation supports the use of multi-coalition
deviations. In this game player 1 has strategy set fl, c, rg, player 2
has fu, m, dg, player 3 has strategies fL, C, Rg, player 4 fU, M, Dg.
In the tables payoﬀ vectors are written as multi-digit numbers to save
space, but this should lead to no confusion. The (up to symmetries)
unique Nash-equilibria is set in boldface.THE CORE IN NORMAL FORM GAMES 21
L C R
l c r l c r l c r
u 2222 0522 0522 1105 0050 0050 1105 0050 0050
U m 5022 0000 0000 0050 0000 0000 0050 0000 0000
d 5022 0000 0000 0050 0000 0000 0050 0000 0000
u 1150 0005 0005 1111 0211 0011 0011 0011 0011
M m 0005 0000 0000 2011 1111 0333 0011 3303 2424
d 0005 0000 0000 0011 3033 2244 0011 4224 2209
u 1150 0005 0005 0011 0011 0011 0033 1011 1011
D m 0005 0000 0000 0011 3330 2442 0111 4422 0922
d 0005 0000 0000 0011 4242 2290 0111 9022 1111
Table 2. The payoﬀ function in case of pure noncoop-
erative behaviour.
ul uc ur
L C R L C R L C R
U 422 205 205 522 050 050 522 050 050
M 250 211 011 005 211 011 005 211 011
D 250 011 033 005 011 111 005 011 111
mc mr dr
L C R L C R L C R
U 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000
M 000 211 603 000 333 624 000 444 409
D 000 630 822 000 642 922 000 490 211
Table 3. Payoﬀs in the noncooperative stage with P1 =
ff1;2g;f3g;f4gg.
Now consider the game where players 1 and 2 formed a coalition
and so instead of maximising their individual payoﬀ they maximise
their joint payoﬀ. The game is symmetric between 1 and 2 and be-
tween 3 and 4. Payoﬀ-identical cases are only listed once. Table 3
gives the coalitional payoﬀs when partition P1 = ff1;2g;f3g;f4gg
is formed. In this representation the ﬁrst coalition chooses matrices,
the second chooses columns and the third chooses rows. The unique
strategy proﬁle that satisﬁes the best-response property is marked in
boldface. In a similar fashion we can create a table of coalitional pay-
oﬀs when P2 = ff1g;f2g;f3;4gg is formed. The payoﬀs are presented
in Table 4.
Finally we present the coalitional payoﬀs for the partition when
both coalitions have formed, that is, when we have partition P3 =
ff1;2g;f3;4gg. In this case the strategies of coalition f1;2g are ful,22 L´ ASZL´ O ´ A. K´ OCZY
UL UC UR
l c r l c r l c r
u 224 054 054 115 005 005 115 005 005
m 504 000 000 005 000 000 005 000 000
d 504 000 000 005 000 000 005 000 000
MC MR DR
l c r l c r l c r
u 112 022 002 002 002 002 006 102 102
m 202 112 036 002 333 246 012 444 094
d 002 306 228 002 426 229 012 904 112
Table 4. Payoﬀs in the noncooperative stage with P2 =
ff1g;f2g;f3;4gg.
ul uc ur mc mr dr
UL 44 54 54 00 00 00
UC 25 05 05 00 00 00
UR 25 05 05 00 00 00
MC 22 22 02 22 36 48
MR 02 02 02 63 66 49
DR 06 12 12 84 94 22
Table 5. Payoﬀs in the noncooperative stage with P3 =
ff1;2g;f3;4gg.
uc=ml, ur=dl, mc, mr=dc, drg, the strategies for f3;4g are fUL,
UC=ML, UR=DL, MC, MR=DC, DRg. Table 5 contains the coali-
tional payoﬀs. This game has again Nash equilibria that are unique up
to the coalitional payoﬀs.
The equilibria and the resulting payoﬀs are therefore exactly as de-
scribed in Section 4.1.1.